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I. INTRODUCTION
The Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement) 2 is an
important source of global rules and norms about international trade law. It is also a source of
rules and norms about investment. Given the lack of consensus about an international agreement
on investment, it is useful to examine the WTO Agreement’s investment-related rules in order to
consider how the concept of investment is being progressively articulated under that treaty.
Vigourous WTO dispute settlement has provided a venue within which to detail and elaborate
upon international investment disciplines, something that countries failed to achieve when
negotiations broke down over a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) in 1998.3
However, the WTO’s limited rules on investment and its role as a “forum by default” should
temper its approach to investment-related claims.
II. THE WTO AND INVESTMENT
The WTO Agreement is a treaty aimed at limiting tariffs, controlling the use of non-tariff
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barriers, and eliminating discriminatory treatment in international trade. It came into being in
1994 to succeed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and expands upon basic
GATT disciplines for trade in goods by providing 12 additional multilateral trade agreements
(MTAs). The MTAs regulate trade in goods more specifically and they prevail over GATT in the
event of a conflict. One of the MTAs is the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
(TRIMS) which was included in the WTO Agreement in recognition of the fact that government
rules about investment can have important effects on international trade. For instance,
competition can be affected by government regulations requiring investors to purchase or use
products of domestic origin, or that impose quotas on imports tied to investors’ rate of exports or
foreign exchange earnings.
Prior to the WTO Agreement, some GATT cases did deal with investment-related rules4
and a few GATT panels took into consideration the reasonable expectations of investors in
finding national legislation non-compliant.5 On the whole, however, an international consensus
about rules relating to investment was lacking. As a matter of theory national laws about
investment may influence trade, but it is not always clear that they do. For instance a
commitment to sell a certain percentage of production within the country of investment does

www.essential.org/monitor/mai/contents.htm (Jan. 13, 1997).
4 See Canada – Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, B.I.S.D. 30th Supp. 140 (1982). The United States in that
case alleged that commitments obtained by the Canadian government from foreign investors to purchase Canadian goods or from
Canadian suppliers constituted “requirements” inconsistent with the national treatment obligation of GATT Art. III:4. The panel
agreed, ruling that the purchasing requirement infringed the rights of exporters who would otherwise have supplied the investor.
However, it found no violation of investor rights or the rights of the investor’s home country. It observed that “The purpose of
GATT Art. III:4 is not to protect the interests of the foreign investor but to ensure that goods originating in any other contracting
party benefit from treatment no less favourable than domestic (Canadian) goods, in respect of the requirements that affect their
purchase (in Canada).” See Ibid., p. 160.
5 See for instance Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather, B.I.S.D. 26th Supp. 320 (1979), para. 55. In this respect see also
United States – Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, B.I.S.D. 39th Supp. 206 (1992), para. 5.60, where legislation
was found to constitute a GATT violation even though it was not being enforced, for the following reason:
Even if Massachusetts may not currently be using its police powers to enforce this mandatory legislation, the
measure continues to be mandatory legislation which may influence the decisions of economic operators.
Hence, a non-enforcement of a mandatory law in respect of imported products does not ensure that imported
beer and wine are not treated less favourably than like domestic products to which the law does not apply
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influence international trade because it depresses demand for imports, whereas it is less clear that
a swift approvals process for foreign investment will. Hence, investment disciplines were
included in the WTO Agreement in a very limited form and an attempt was made to ensure that
they were strictly trade-related.
Recently, however, investor expectations have been “rediscovered” by WTO panels as a
justification for declaring national legislation WTO-inconsistent. Two recent WTO panels have
made clear that even the potential of proposed or discretionary government measures to impact
upon individual investors is reason to find national laws WTO-inconsistent.6 The problem with
this development is that whereas the text of TRIMS is careful to apply international rules about
investment to trade-related measures, no such care is taken by panels in defining the scope of
reasonable “investor expectations”. Almost any government measure – from zoning regulations
to changes in the discount rate – could be said to impact upon individual investor decisions.
Unfortunately, panels have not given any indication when the reasoning of expectations will be
applied. Consequently, the latest interpretations offer overly broad scope for WTO dispute
settlement to constrain government action.
III. THE TRIMS AGREEMENT AND ITS INTERPRETATION
Daniel Price and Bryan Christy observe that while “proponents of investment discussions
in the Uruguay Round had high hopes for the conclusion of a new multilateral agreement on
investment”, the final text of the WTO Agreement made only a modest contribution to the
protection of investment.7 The TRIMS Agreement only covers trade in goods. It does not apply

[emphasis added].
United States – Section 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999); United States – Import Measures on
Certain Products from the European Communities, WT/DS165/R (July 17, 2000).
7 D.M. Price & P.B. Christy, III, Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures: Limitations and Prospects for the Future in
T.P. Stewart (ed.), THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 439 (1996).
6
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investment disciplines to the two other domains of WTO coverage, services or intellectual
property.8
The TRIMS’ nine articles cover national treatment and quantitative restrictions,
differential treatment for developing countries, notification of non-conforming measures and
transitional provisions, transparency, and institutional arrangements. The core TRIMS
obligations are set out in TRIMS Art. 2, which reads:
1. Without prejudice to other rights and obligations under GATT 1994, no Member shall
apply any TRIM that is inconsistent with the provisions of Article III or Article XI of
GATT 1994.
2. An illustrative list of TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligation of national
treatment provided for in paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 and the obligation of
general elimination of quantitative restrictions provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XI
of GATT 1994 is contained in the Annex to this Agreement.

By this article WTO members are prohibited from applying trade-related investment measures in
a way that contravenes the national treatment obligation in GATT Art. III or the prohibition on
quantitative restrictions in GATT Art. XI. This means, for example, that governments cannot
condition national treatment on the use of a specific volume or value of domestic products nor
can they restrict an investor’s imports based on its rate of local production. Additionally, under
TRIMS Art. 5.2 WTO members have committed to phase-out all existing non-conforming
TRIMS by 2002.
A preliminary matter in determining the ambit of the TRIMS Agreement is the definition
of “investment measures”. TRIMS contains an Illustrative List of prohibited investment
measures, but this uses the term “includes” and is therefore not exhaustive. There remains

TRIMS Art. 1 states that “This Agreement applies to investment measures related to trade in goods only”. Akira Kotera has
pointed out that the GATS in effect provides for investment disciplines by allowing for WTO member countries to specifically
commit to the commercial presence of foreign service providers within their national territory. See Akira Kotera, Are Multilateral
Investment Rules Necessary and Possible?: On Trade and Investment in the WTO’s Multilateral Trade Negotiations, elsewhere in
this volume.
8
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considerable scope for the identification of prohibited TRIMS in the course of WTO dispute
settlement.
In Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry9 the panel stated that
it did not intend to provide a uniform definition. Instead the panel emphasized that “our
characterization of the measures as “investment measures” is based on an examination of the
manner in which the measures at issue in this case relate to investment”10, adding that “There
may be other measures which qualify as investment measures within the meaning of the TRIMS
Agreement because they relate to investment in a different manner.”11 In that instance the panel
concluded that investment measures were measures necessarily having “a significant impact on
investment” in the industrial sector under scrutiny, automobile manufacturing. The panel also
concluded that the specific measure at issue, a local content requirement, was “trade-related”
because it tended to distort domestic production, with inevitable consequences for imports.12
The definition offered by the panel in Indonesia – Autos is open-ended, offering little
guidance for panels identifying investment measures in the future. The panel’s focus on the
manner of the measure’s application was essentially effects-based, yet there was little in its
methodology about what criteria are to used to determine effect. Many government measures can
tend to distort domestic production and can therefore be said to be “trade-related”. Consider a
business tax or a pollution abatement measure. Likewise, there was no indication when the effect
would be considered to have gone beyond some permissible threshold and have an impermissible
“significant impact”. One possibility might be to say that the manner of a measure’s application

9

WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R (July 2, 1998).
Ibid., para. 14.80.
11 Id.
12 “We now have to determine whether these investment measures are “trade-related”. We consider that, if these measures are
local content requirements, they would necessarily be “trade-related” because such requirements, by definition, always favour the
10
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where it is production-related, that is, where it has a demonstrable impact upon the production of
a good. Again, however, this reasoning is speculative. Ultimately, the analysis in Indonesia –
Autos is vague and unsatisfying.
TRIMS Art. 2.1 is an application to investment measures of the national treatment
obligation embodied in GATT Art. III. For instance in European Communities – Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas13 (Bananas III) the panel observed that “the TRIMS
Agreement essentially interprets and clarifies the provisions of Article III (and also Article XI)
where trade-related investment measures are concerned.” The panel added that “the TRIMS
Agreement does not add to or subtract from those GATT obligations, although it clarifies that
Article III:4 may cover investment-related matters.”14 This observation is confirmed by the scant
jurisprudence on TRIMS to date. Countries have been more willing to invoke GATT rather than
TRIMS, giving the agreement a secondary importance.15
National treatment in GATT Art. III and national treatment of investors in TRIMS Art.
2.1 are not equal or co-extensive obligations. The panel in Indonesia – Certain Measures
Affecting the Automobile Industry16 emphasized that while “the TRIMS Agreement codifies the
GATT 1947 panel jurisprudence concerning Article III:4 arising out of such cases as Italian
Tractors, EC - Parts and Components, and FIRA … more generally, Article III:2, Article III:4, and
the TRIMS Agreement each impose legally distinct obligations on Members, and a single measure
use of domestic products over imported products, and therefore affect trade.” Id., para. 14.82.
13 WT/DS27/R/USA (May 22, 1997).
14 Ibid., para. 7.185.
15 “The local content requirement aspects of the measures at issue have been addressed pursuant to the claims of the complainants
under the TRIMS Agreement. We consider therefore that action to remedy the inconsistencies that we have found with
Indonesia’s obligations under the TRIMS Agreement would necessarily remedy any inconsistency that we might find with the
provisions of Article III:4 of GATT.” Indonesia – Autos, para. 14.93; “a finding that the measure in question would not be
considered a trade-related investment measure for the purposes of the TRIMS Agreement would not affect our findings in respect
of Article III:4 since the scope of that provision is not limited to TRIMS and, on the other hand, steps taken to bring EC licensing
procedures into conformity with Article III:4 would also eliminate the alleged non-conformity with obligations under the TRIMS
Agreement.” Bananas III, para. 7.186.
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may be found to be inconsistent with all three.”

17

The panel went on to explain that “when the

TRIMS Agreement refers to “the provisions of Article III”, it refers to the substantive aspects of
Article III; that is to say, conceptually, it is the ten paragraphs of Article III that are referred to in
Article 2.1 of the TRIMS Agreement, and not the application of Article III in the WTO context
as such.”18
The distinct nature of the legal obligation under TRIMS may be difficult to identify given
that it is usually applied together with other WTO disciplines to a single legislative measure.19 The
panel in Indonesia – Autos acknowledged this potential double aspect, that is, the provisions'
national treatment character and their investment character. In that case the panel identified its
task under TRIMS as being to determine the WTO consistency of local content requirements
made effective through the custom duty and tax benefits for Indonesia’s car programs versus the
more general GATT Art. III:4 task of discerning differential treatment between foreign and
domestically produced automobiles in Indonesia.
The association of TRIMS Art. 2.1 with GATT Art. III:4 has tended to blend the analysis
of both provisions. In Indonesia – Autos TRIMS was held to be lex specialibus and to take
precedence in the order of analysis.20 In Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive

16

WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R (July 2, 1998).
Ibid., paras. 6.100-6.103.
18 The panel’s articulation of its reasoning is somewhat opaque. It added “Thus if Article III is not applicable for any reason not
related to the disciplines of Article III itself, the provisions of Article III remain applicable for the purpose of the TRIMS
Agreement. This view is reinforced by the fact that Article 3 of the TRIMS Agreement contains a distinct and explicit reference
to the general exceptions to GATT. If the purpose of the TRIMS Agreement were to refer to Article III as applied in the light of
other (non Article III) GATT rules, there would be no need to refer to such general exceptions.” Id., para. 14.61. “…the TRIMS
Agreement has an autonomous legal existence, independent from that of Article III. Consequently, since the TRIMS Agreement
and Article III remain two legally distinct and independent sets of provisions of the WTO Agreement, we find that even if either
of the two sets of provisions were not applicable the other one would remain applicable.” Id., para. 14.62.
19 WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R, para. 14.52 (July 2, 1998).
20 “… we consider that we should first examine the claims under the TRIMS Agreement since the TRIMS Agreement is more
specific than Article III:4 as far as the claims under consideration are concerned.” Indonesia – Autos, para. 14.63.
17
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Industry , however, TRIMS was interpreted distinctly and supplementarily. There the panel
observed:
… we note that there is disagreement between the parties not only on whether the
measures at issue can be considered to be "trade-related investment measures" but also on
whether the Canadian value added requirements and ratio requirements are explicitly
covered by the Illustrative List annexed to the TRIMS Agreement. It would thus appear
that, assuming that the measures at issue are "trade-related investment measures", their
consistency with Article III:4 of the GATT may not be able to be determined simply on
the basis of the text of the Illustrative List but may require an analysis based on the
wording of Article III:4. Consequently, we doubt that examining the claims first under
the TRIMS Agreement will enable us to resolve the dispute before us in a more efficient
manner than examining these claims under Article III:4.22

The conceptual proximity of TRIMS with GATT means that WTO panels will rarely
make a finding of violation based solely on TRIMS. In Indonesia – Autos, for instance, the panel
found that tax and tariff benefits contingent on meeting local requirements under Indonesia’s car
programs were impermissible advantages under TRIMS, but then went on to make findings
under GATT Art. III:2.23 In contrast in Bananas III the panel found that the allocation to certain
operators of a percentage of licences allowing the importation of third-country and nontraditional ACP bananas at in-quota tariff rates was inconsistent with the requirements of GATT
Art. III:4. Consequently, it reasoned that there was no need to make a finding on TRIMS Art. 2.24
Thus, a particular national measure may contravene Art. III, but that does not necessarily make it
a violation of investment rules. This conclusion should strike a cautionary note about the need to
examine and interpret WTO investment obligations reasonably and not simply because a national
measure could conceivably affect investment decisions in some way.
TRIMS Art. 2.1 also refers to the possibility that an investment measure could violate the
obligation to generally eliminate quantitative restrictions set out in GATT Art. XI:1. GATT Art.
21

WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R (May 31, 2000).
Ibid., para. 10.63.
23 WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R, para. 14.91, 14.114 (July 2, 1998).
22
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XI:1 is essentially a catch-all. GATT and WTO panels have deemed a wide range of behaviour
to contravene it.25 For this reason the Illustrative List in the Annex to TRIMS sets out traderelated investment measures which are clearly inconsistent with GATT Art. XI:1, including those
which tie imports to the value of production exported or to foreign exchange inflows, or which
restrict the total exports from an enterprise. To date there have been no successful challenges
under this provision.
In conclusion, then, the similarity of TRIMS and GATT obligations makes TRIMS of
secondary significance to the general obligation to treat imports and exports like national
products. At the same time, the fact that at least one panel has made a distinction between
TRIMS and GATT disciplines suggests that this difference may be further elaborated upon in
future, perhaps in a decision on the relationship between TRIMS and GATT Art. XI:1.
IV. THE CONCEPT OF INVESTMENT UNDER THE WTO AGREEMENT
The relatively limited nature of TRIMS jurisprudence is to be contrasted with panel
pronouncements in recent WTO cases where the concept of investment has been broadly
interpreted to justify findings of inconsistency. Whereas the text of TRIMS is careful to tie
investment rules to trade-related activity, the latest interpretations appear to proscribe
government measures because of their potential to impact on wide-ranging investor expectations,
with considerable possibility for constraining government action. This goes well beyond the
negotiated wording of TRIMS.

24

WT/DS27/R/USA, para. 7.187 (May 22, 1997).
GATT Art. XI:1 provides that “No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective
through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting parties …”. The
prohibition has been held to extend to “administrative guidance (Japan – Semi-conductors, B.I.S.D. 35th Supp. 157), residual
restrictions (French Import Restrictions, B.I.S.D. 11th Supp. 94; EEC – Quantitative Restrictions Against Imports of Certain
Products from Hong Kong, B.I.S.D. 30th Supp. 129), import or export prohibitions (United States – Restrictions on Imports of
Tuna, B.I.S.D. 39th Supp. 201; Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, B.I.S.D. 35th Supp.
98) and minimum price systems for imports or exports (EEC – Programme of Minimum Import Prices, Licences and Surety
25
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At least two recent WTO cases stressed the need to provide “security and predictability”
to investors as a basis for finding proposed government action WTO-incompatible. The phrase
originates in the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding26 (DSU) which provides an integrated
set of dispute resolution procedures for the WTO. DSU Art. 3.2 describes the WTO dispute
settlement system as “a central element in providing security and predictability to the
multilateral trading system.”
In United States – Section 301-310 of the Trade Act of 197427 the measure at issue was ss.
304-306 of the United States Trade Act of 1974.28 This legislation is designed to authorize
retaliation against foreign unfair trade practices. The Act permits the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) to make a finding of inconsistency of a foreign measure under s. 304 of
the Act, and establishes time limits within which determinations must be made and trade
sanctions taken under ss. 305 and 306. The principal complaint of the European Community was
that s. 304 contravened DSU Art. 23 by providing for an independent decision on compliance by
the USTR versus a reconvened panel of the WTO, and that ss. 305-306 contravened the DSU
more generally by precluding the United States from complying with DSU rules in situations
where a prior multilateral ruling on the conformity of implementing measures had not yet been
adopted by the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body.29
The principal US submission contended that only legislation mandating a WTO

Deposits for Certain processed Fruits and Vegetables, B.I.S.D. 25 Supp. 68).
26 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994).
27 WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999).
28 19 U.S.C. §2411.
29 DSU Art. 23.1 provides that:
When members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits
under the covered agreements or an impediment tto the attainment of any objective of the covered
agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of [the DSU].

Final Version

inconsistency or precluding WTO consistency, could, as such, violate the WTO Agreement.30
The panel disagreed. It observed with respect to s. 304 that:
The statutory language which gives the USTR this discretion [to make a finding of
inconsistency] on its face precludes the US from abiding by its obligations under the
WTO. In each and every case when a determination is made whilst DSU proceedings are
not yet exhausted, Members locked in a dispute with the US will be subject to a
mandatory determination by the USTR under a statute which explicitly puts them in that
very danger which Article 23 was intended to remove.31

In particular, the panel was concerned that “a promise to have recourse to and abide by the rules
and procedures of the DSU, also in one's legislation, includes the undertaking to refrain from
adopting national laws which threaten prohibited conduct.”32
What was the panel’s rationale for finding mere threatened, as opposed to actual,
conduct WTO-inconsistent? The panel grounded its reasoning in the protection of individual
economic activity, a protection implicitly linked to individual investment decisions. It stated:
Many of the benefits to Members which are meant to flow as a result of the acceptance of
various disciplines under the GATT/WTO depend on the activity of individual economic
operators in the national and global market places. The purpose of many of these
disciplines, indeed one of the primary objects of the GATT/WTO as a whole, is to
produce certain market conditions which would allow this individual activity to
flourish.33

A source of this obligation was WTO Agreement’s requirement of “security and
predictability” in the multilateral trading system. The panel added:
The security and predictability in question are of "the multilateral trading system". The
multilateral trading system is, per force, composed not only of States but also, indeed
mostly, of individual economic operators. The lack of security and predictability affects
mostly these individual operators.
Trade is conducted most often and increasingly by private operators. It is through
improved conditions for these private operators that Members benefit from WTO
disciplines. The denial of benefits to a Member which flows from a breach is often
indirect and results from the impact of the breach on the market place and the activities of
30

WT/DS152/R, para. 7.51 (Dec. 22, 1999) [emphasis added].
Ibid., para. 7.61.
32 Id., para. 7.68.
33 Id., para. 7.73.
31
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individuals within it. Sections 301-310 themselves recognize this nexus. One of the
principal triggers for US action to vindicate US rights under covered agreements is the
impact alleged breaches have had on, and the complaint emanating from, individual
economic operators.34

The panel’s references to individual economic operators were undoubtedly connected with their
individual investment decisions. In the panel’s conception, private actors conduct business
activity based on the security of the trading environment and this, in turn, guides investment
decisions. For this reason the prospective effect on investment of threatened retaliatory action
was enough to invoke the panel’s condemnation. The panel observed that “in a treaty the benefits
of which depend in part on the activity of individual operators the legislation itself may be
construed as a breach, since the mere existence of legislation could have an appreciable "chilling
effect" on the economic activities of individuals.”35 The reference to “economic activity” is
undoubtedly investment. This was made clear in the panel’s observation that:
a domestic law which exposed imported products to future discrimination was recognized
by some GATT panels to constitute, by itself, a violation of Article III, even before the
law came into force. Finally, and most tellingly, even where there was no certainty but
only a risk under the domestic law that the tax would be discriminatory, certain GATT
panels found that the law violated the obligation in Article III. A similar approach was
followed in respect of Article II of GATT 1994 by the WTO panel on Argentina –
Textiles and Apparel (US) when it found that the very change in system from ad valorem
to specific duties was a breach of Argentina's ad valorem tariff binding even though such
change only brought about the potential of the tariff binding being exceeded depending
on the price of the imported product.
The rationale in all types of cases has always been the negative effect on economic
operators created by such domestic laws. An individual would simply shift his or her
trading patterns – buy domestic products, for example, instead of imports – so as to avoid
the would-be taxes announced in the legislation or even the mere risk of discriminatory
taxation. Such risk or threat, when real, was found to affect the relative competitive
opportunities between imported and domestic products because it could, in and of itself,
bring about a shift in consumption from imported to domestic products: This shift would
be caused by, for example, an increase in the cost of imported products and a negative
impact on economic planning and investment to the detriment of those products. This
rationale was paraphrased in the Superfund case as follows:

34
35

Id., 7.76-7.77.
Id., 7.81.
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"to protect expectations of the contracting parties as to the competitive relationship
between their products and those of the other contracting parties. Both articles [GATT
Articles III and XI] are not only to protect current trade but also to create the
predictability needed to plan future trade".36

The U.S. – Section 301 panel therefore concluded that “Article III:2 is not only a promise not to
discriminate in a specific case, but is also designed to give certain guarantees to the market place
and the operators within it that discriminatory taxes will not be imposed.” Discretionary
legislation permitting unilateral action would damage the marketplace itself because:
The mere fact of having legislation the statutory language of which permits conduct
which is WTO prohibited – namely, the imposition of unilateral measures against other
Members with which it is locked in a trade dispute – may in and of itself prompt
economic operators to change their commercial behaviour in a way that distorts trade.
Economic operators may be afraid, say, to continue ongoing trade with, or investment in,
the industries or products threatened by unilateral measures.37

The investment-focused language employed by the panel in U.S. – Section 301 has had a
profound effect. It has been cited in at least one subsequent WTO decision. In U.S. – Import
Measures on Certain Products from the European Communities it was cited in support of the
panel’s position that unilateral measures taken without prior WTO authorization violate the WTO
Agreement.38 Moreover, the focus on investment can be seen as a key element in several other
recent cases such as Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products39 and Canada –
Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry.40 In those instances the impact of laws on
investment decision-making was clearly part of the panel’s conclusion to declare national
legislation WTO-inconsistent.
Notwithstanding the expansive interpretation given to investment protection under WTO
rules, there does not appear to be a similar concern about investment in the context of WTO-

36

Op. cit., para. 5.2.2.
WT/DS152/R, para. 7.90 (Dec. 22, 1999).
38 WT/DS165/R, para. 6.15 (July 17, 2000).
39 WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000).
37
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authorized retaliation, a potential blindspot. This was evident in European Communities –
Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Recourse to Arbitration by the
European Communities under DSU Art. 22.6 (Complaint by Ecuador)41, one of several spin-offs
from the WTO Bananas III litigation.42 In the penultimate stage of the litigation Ecuador
requested permission to retaliate against $1 billion worth of EC goods, services, and intellectual
property to counter the effect of the EC’s discriminatory banana tariff. The Ecuadorian request
was interesting inasmuch as retaliation until that time had focused on goods. There was
considerable uncertainty about how service and intellectual property disciplines would be
suspended. Ecuador therefore asked the arbitrator for suggestions about ways to do so.
The arbitrator’s comments are of interest because while WTO panels have emphasized
the potential of discretionary legislation to detract from the security and predictability in the
international trading system, the arbitrator appeared less concerned with the fate of those who
might seek to take advantage of conditions created by WTO retaliation, that is, the “Ecuadorian
CD bootleggers” and others, for investment purposes. The arbitrator found, for instance, that no
trade in goods or intellectual services produced under a retaliatory regime could be traded
internationally. For the purposes of its analysis the arbitrator considered goods produced under a
retaliatory regime to be “counterfeit trade or pirated copyright goods” which countries have the
right to suspend the import of under TRIPS Art. 51.43 This seems an unnecessary conclusion
given that such goods are not, strictly speaking, illegal, being manufactured by colour of right

40

WT/DS139-142/AB/R (May 31, 2000).
WT/DS27/ARB/ECU (Mar. 24, 2000).
42 See also United States – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999); United States – Import
Measures on Certain Products from the European Communities, WT/DS165/R (July 17, 2000).
43 Thus under TRIPS Art. 51 countries shall “adopt procedures to enable a right holder who has valid grounds for suspecting that
the importation of counterfeit trade or pirated copyright goods may take place, to lodge an application in writing with competent
authorities, administrative or judicial, for the suspension by the customs authorities of the release into free circulation of such
goods.”
41
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pursuant to WTO authorization. The distinction was, however, lost on the arbitrator. Instead, the
arbitrator asserted that limitation on their international trade would help to avoid “distortions in
third-country markets”44 without considering the investment decisions of individual economic
operators in a country authorized to retaliate. The arbitrator cautioned that:
Given this temporary nature of the suspension of concessions or other obligations,
economic actors in Ecuador should be fully aware of the temporary nature of the
suspension of certain TRIPS obligations so as to minimise the risk of them entering into
investments and activities which might not prove viable in the longer term.45

Here the difficulties of reconciling WTO authorization to retaliate with the reality of
investment in the marketplace became starkly apparent. The arbitrator suggested that individual
entrepreneurs might be interested in investing in a temporary regime for the manufacture of
goods, provision of services, or the use of intellectual property, without taking into consideration
that the very temporary nature of such investment might be a disincentive to retaliate. In other
words, the arbitrator overlooked the specific concern articulated in U.S. – Section 301 and other
cases that investment should occur under secure and predictable conditions; in a WTO retaliation
scenario no security or predictability could be promised. This inherent disadvantage put into
question the integrity of the concept of investment under the WTO Agreement.
V. A NEW MAI?

44

The arbitrator also referred to several cases where investment would be damaged by retaliatory action, observing for instance
that “the requested suspension of certain TRIPS obligations ultimately interferes with private rights owned by natural or legal
persons.” Likewise the arbitrator noted that “We are aware that the implementation of the suspension of certain TRIPS
obligations may give rise to legal difficulties or conflicts within the domestic legal system of the Member so authorized (and
perhaps even of the Member(s) affected by such suspension).” The arbitrator was also aware of the difficulties that suspension of
certain service obligations would create:
In our view, it does not seem difficult to prevent EC service suppliers (in the pre-establishment stage) from
establishing themselves in Ecuador. However, it may be possible in theory, but difficult to implement in
practice, to prevent already locally established service suppliers of EC origin (in the post-establishment stage)
from supplying services within Ecuador's territory. For example, it may cause administrative difficulties to
close or limit the service output of a commercial presence in the form of a branch or representative office.
Additional legal and administrative difficulties may arise when closing or limiting the output of a commercial
presence in the form of an establishment enjoying legal personality in its own right due to the legal protection
granted to juridical persons by national or international law.
45 See WT/DS27/ARB/ECU (Mar. 24, 2000), para. 165 [emphasis added].
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One remaining question is how the current protection of investment under the WTO
Agreement compares with the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI)? Do these emerging
interpretations replicate the MAI? The central disciplines of the MAI concerned treatment of
investors and investment and investment protection. MAI Part III provided for national treatment
and MFN for investors and investment as well as on a number of “special topics” (key personnel,
performance requirements, privatisation, monopolies/state enterprises, investment incentives and
corporate practices, senior management and boards of directors). MAI Part IV provided for
investment protection with respect to general treatment, expropriation and compensation,
protection from strife, transfers, subrogation, protection of existing investments and the
protection of investor rights from other agreements.
Basic TRIMS set out in the TRIMS’ Illustrative List cover only a small portion of MAI’s
disciplines. However, the renewed emphasis on “security and predictability of the multilateral
trading system” appears to go considerably further. The broad concept of investment could now
encompass government mandated performance requirements, investment incentives and
corporate practices, as well as aspects of general treatment, protection from strife, transfers, and
subrogation. Even the sensitive topic of expropriation could conceivably fall within the “security
and predictability” afforded to individual economic operators. As a result, new thinking about
investment under the WTO Agreement may in fact replicate MAI disciplines in important
respects.
The fundamental difficulty with the developing jurisprudence is its lack of adequate
definition. Governments are constantly taking action that might somehow impact upon individual
investment decisions. The reasoning pursued by the panel in U.S. – Section 301 and subsequently
followed by other panels offers a poorly defined basis for distinguishing between pro- and anti-
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investment measures and therefore between WTO-permissible and prohibited legislation. Indeed,
one could ask what government measure does not impact the “security and predictability of the
multilateral trading system”? Panels should be wary of expansive interpretations in this regard
given the lack of consensus on investment disciplines that led to the abandonment of negotiations
over an MAI.
VI. CONCLUSION
The concept of investment under the WTO Agreement has evolved from something
modest into something considerably more ambitious. The TRIMS Agreement exists in close
association with the substantive obligations of GATT Art. III and XI, which make it difficult to
distinguish as a separate body of rules. However, experience with the TRIMS is to be contrasted
with recent interpretation of the phrase “security and predictability of the multilateral trading
system” in DSU Art. 3.2, where the words “multilateral trading system” have been taken to refer
to the wider investment community and the potential impact of legislation on it. This concept of
investment is a broad and ill-defined one that extends WTO disciplines, but at the same time is
not always applied consistently, as the arbitrator’s comments on Ecuador’s request to retaliate in
Bananas III revealed.
The developing jurisprudence about investment is notable at a time when the WTO must
be acutely concerned about its legitimacy. The focus on individual economic interests is a
renewed one, but is also problematic because legitimacy requires consistent treatment of
economic operators in all circumstances of WTO action. So far panels has not developed any
consistent logic on this point. Treatment of investment under the WTO Agreement obviously
remains something to be more completely and comprehensively developed in the future.

